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Recent monetary search models emphasize that the real effects of inflation via its
impact on price dispersion depend on the level of search costs and, thus, on the
level of market integration. For less integrated markets, the inflation-price disper-
sion nexus is predicted to be asymmetrically V-shaped which implies an optimal
inflation rate above zero. For highly integrated markets, however, theory suggests
that the impact of inflation on price dispersion disappears. Employing price data
of the European Union member states, this paper is the first that empirically tests
these implications of monetary search theory.
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1 Introduction
In macroeconomic theory, the impact of inflation on price dispersion is a major channel
of real effects of inflation. According to menu-cost (Benabou, 1992) or Lucas-type
misperception models (Barro, 1976) inflation increases relative price variability (RPV),
distorts the information content of prices, and, thereby, impedes the efficient allocation
of resources. Both types of models imply a monotonous inflation-RPV nexus in which
inflation always lowers welfare. As a consequence, the early empirical evidence is
typically based on linear regressions of RPV on the rate of inflation (see e.g. Debelle
and Lamont, 1997, and Jaramillo, 1999).
Recent monetary search models predict that the impact of inflation on price disper-
sion and welfare is more complex. According to Head and Kumar (2005), both the
inflation-RPV and the inflation-welfare nexus are asymmetrically V-shaped provided
that search costs are sufficiently high. As a consequence, the optimal rate of infla-
tion for economies with high search costs is above zero. In case of very low search
costs, however, the relationship between inflation and RPV breaks down. These the-
oretical implications for the inflation-RPV nexus have never been tested empirically.
Assuming that search costs decrease when markets become more integrated, the cur-
rent paper fills this gap by estimating the relationship between inflation and RPV for
sub-groups of European countries with different degrees of goods market integration.
Contradicting the predictions of standard menu-cost or misperception models, recent
empirical evidence suggests that the relation between inflation and RPV is non-linear,
see e.g. Fielding and Mizen (2008) and Bick and Nautz (2008). A first attempt to explic-
itly test the implications of the Head and Kumar (2005) model is given by Caglayan
et al. (2008). Using price observations from bazaars, convenience stores, and super-
markets in Turkey, they confirm a V-shaped relationship between inflation and RPV.
However, their data set does not allow to explore the role of market integration for the
inflation-RPV nexus.
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Monetary search models are designed for countries with low or moderate inflation
rates (see Head and Kumar, 2005, p.535). Therefore, members of the European Union
(EU) are natural candidates for an empirical test of these models. Although European
integration has made considerably progress on average, notable differences in goods
market integration across Europe have remained. The following analysis compares
two groups of countries. The first group contains the highly integrated Euro-area
countries where a common currency contributes to keep search costs low. The second
group contains the rather heterogenous group of all 27 EU member states where mar-
kets are less integrated and, thus, search costs should be significantly higher compared
to Euro-area countries, see Engel and Rogers (2004) and Parsley and Wei (2008).
Our empirical results show that the impact of inflation on price dispersion is non-
linear and crucially depends on the level of goods market integration. In particular,
the evidence supports both predictions of the monetary search model. On the one
hand, the empirical relation between inflation and price dispersion is asymmetrically
V-shaped in the less integrated EU-27 economy suggesting an optimal annual inflation
rate of about 3%. On the other hand, there is no significant impact of inflation on price
dispersion for the highly integrated Euro-area markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the Head and
Kumar (2005) monetary search model and derives testable implications for the empiri-
cal relationship between inflation and RPV. Section 3 introduces the data and specifies
the price variability and inflation measures. Section 4 presents the empirical results
obtained for the inflation-RPV nexus of the EU27 and the Euro-area countries. Section
5 discusses the robustness of the results and Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Monetary Search Model
2.1 Inflation, Price Dispersion and Welfare Costs
The Head and Kumar (2005) monetary search model emphasizes that buyers have
only incomplete information about the prices offered by different sellers. In this model,
the impact of inflation on price dispersion and welfare is determined by two opposing
effects. On the one hand, higher expected inflation lowers the value of fiat money,
which increases demand for goods and, thereby, sellers’ market power.1 Since market
power differs across sellers, higher expected inflation leads to higher price dispersion.
On the other hand, higher expected inflation also raises the gains of search which adds
two further dimensions to its effect on welfare. First, the search induced by inflation
is costly. And second, because it induces search, inflation increases buyers’ informa-
tion and, thereby, weakens sellers’ market power. Therefore, inflation may have also
welfare-improving effects by reducing the dispersion of prices. As a result, the sign of
the overall effect of inflation on price dispersion and welfare is not obvious.
In order to shed more light on the overall effect of inflation on price dispersion and
welfare, we solved the monetary search model by Head and Kumar (2005) numeri-
cally. Detailed presentations of the model and the simulation exercise are provided in
Appendix A1.
Figure 1 displays the benchmark simulation for inflation’s impact on welfare and price
dispersion.2 The figure shows that at low inflation rates the reduction of market power
resulting from increased search intensity in response to an increase in inflation is suf-
ficient to decrease price dispersion and to raise welfare (i.e. welfare costs decrease).
1Note that the only source of inflation is the growth of the money stock. Thus, inflation is unambigu-
ously overall inflation and should not be interpreted as the growth rate of the price level of a specific
category of goods. Since households maximize their expected utility, they care about expected future
money growth, i.e. expected overall inflation.
2The welfare cost of inflation is measured by the quantity of consumption required to give a represen-
tative household the same utility as she would receive in the optimum (without asymmetric information)
as a percentage of optimum consumption.
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However, when inflation exceeds a critical value, the search-increasing effect of in-
flation gets negligible and the welfare distorting effect of inflation on sellers’ market
power eventually dominates. As a result, the relationship between expected inflation
and price dispersion can be captured by an asymmetric V-shaped specification where
the vertex occurs at positive levels of inflation. Note that the welfare maximizing infla-
tion rateΠ∗, which is determined by the minimum of the welfare cost curve, is located
below but very close to the vertex of the inflation-RPV nexus. Accordingly, this vertex
may serve as a proxy for Π∗.
Figure 1: Inflation, price dispersion, and welfare
Notes: The figure shows the impact of expected inflation on price
dispersion and welfare as predicted by the monetary search model
introduced by Head and Kumar (2005). Price Dispersion (solid line
- left scale); Compensating Consumption (%) (dashed line - right
scale). For more details, see Appendix A1.
In the appendix, we show that V-shaped effects of inflation require search costs to be
sufficiently high. Since the level of search costs should be negatively related to the
degree of market integration, this leads to our first empirically testable implication of
the monetary search model:
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Hypothesis 1: Consider the monetary search model of Head and Kumar (2005). Provided
that the degree of market integration in an economy is sufficiently low, the relationship be-
tween expected inflation and RPV is asymmetrically V-shaped with a non-zero optimal rate of
inflation.
A first attempt to test this hypothesis is given by Caglayan et al. (2008) who found,
however, a symmetric V-shaped relationship between price dispersion and expected
inflation in Turkey.
2.2 Search Costs and Market Integration
In the benchmark simulation presented above, the model has been solved for param-
eter values typically used in the literature. In particular, search costs have been cal-
ibrated to achieve an average mark-up of prices over marginal costs of 10%, see e.g.
Gali et al. (2001). However, due to the ongoing market integration in the Euro-area,
mark-ups may have declined over the recent years.
To shed more light on the role of search costs for the real effects of inflation, we com-
puted additional model simulations with varying levels of search costs. The upper
graph in Figure 2 displays the asymmetric V-shaped linkage between inflation and
RPV for the benchmark simulation. In the middle graph search costs are lower, but
still high enough to generate real effects of inflation. Compared to the benchmark the
inflation-RPV nexus shifts downwards: With lower search costs the proportion of buy-
ers observing only one price quote decreases, simply because buyers pay less search
costs for any given level of search intensity. It follows that sellers market power di-
minishes resulting in a lower level of price dispersion at all inflation rates. The lower
graph which equals the zero line depicts the inflation-RPV nexus for a low search cost
market. Here, search costs fall below a critical threshold and inflation has no effects
on price dispersion. If search costs fall below the threshold, all buyers optimally ob-
serve more than one price quote. In the absence of shocks and under the assumption
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of constant marginal costs across sellers, the only possible price distribution is then
concentrated at the marginal cost price such that price dispersion equals zero. In this
case, the distorting effect of inflation on price dispersion vanishes and the classical
dichotomy holds.3
Figure 2: The inflation-RPV nexus and the role of search costs
Notes: Figure plots price dispersion versus inflation for varying levels of
search costs: i) high search costs (upper graph) ii) moderate search costs
(middle graph) and iii) low search costs (lower graph). See Appendix A1
and Figure 1 for more details.
We summarize this prediction of Head and Kumar (2005) as follows:
Hypothesis 2 For a highly integrated market, where search costs are sufficiently low, there
is no significant impact of expected inflation on the dispersion of prices.
3For a detailed description of the different model simulations, see Appendix A1 where we also give a
more technical discussion of the Head and Kumar monetary search model.
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2.3 Market Integration in the European Union
According to the predictions of Head and Kumar (2005) and the hypotheses stated
above, market integration crucially affects the relationship between inflation and price
dispersion. In the following, both hypotheses will be tested using panel data from two
subgroups of EU member states characterized by different levels of market integra-
tion. For Euro-area countries, on the one hand, much progress on the issue of market
integration and price transparency has been made with the Single Market Program
of 1992 and the introduction of the Euro in 1999. Using price data across different
Euro-area countries, Engel and Rogers (2004) find evidence for an advanced integra-
tion of Eurozone consumer markets caused by the efforts to reduce economic barriers
initiated in the 1990s. Furthermore, Parsley and Wei (2008) show that market integra-
tion among the countries in the Eurozone is uniformly higher compared to non-Euro
countries. Therefore, the Euro-area should represent a highly integrated market where
search costs are low. On the other hand, the EU 27 economy consists of a very hetero-
geneous group of countries and exhibits a lower degree of market integration.4
3 Data and Measurement
Many empirical contributions analyzed the impact of inflation on intermarket rela-
tive price variability (RPV), see e.g. Debelle and Lamont (1997), Jaramillo (1999), and
Becker and Nautz (2009). Intermarket RPV is typically defined as the standard devi-
ation of the rates of inflation of various products of goods and services around the
average inflation rate in a given city or country. By contrast, the intramarket side
4Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Spain are grouped together in Euro-area, whereas the EU-27 group consists of the Euro-area
countries plus Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and United Kingdom. Although Slovenia, Cyprus and
Malta adopted the Euro in 2007 and 2008, respectively, we do not include them into the Euro-area group,
because our sample already starts in 1996. This implicates that Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta did not par-
ticipate in the EMU for the major part of our sample period. Alternatively, one can split the countries into
a Euro-area group and a non-Euro group. The qualitative results presented in this paper do not depend
on this splitting scheme.
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(deviations of individual product specific inflation rates with respect to the product
average inflation rate across cities or countries) seems to be underresearched.5 In the
following empirical study, the focus shall be on price variability in Europe within the
intramarket side because search models are specifically designed to account for price
dispersion within a given market.
We use monthly data for various subcategories of the Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP) provided by the Eurostat database. The data set runs from January 1996
to August 2008. It includes observations of the twelve major HICP subcategories for









where piijt is the rate of change in the price index of the ith subcategory in country j at
time period t and piit is the average rate of change in product category i‘s price index
(piit = ∑Nj=1 wjtpiijt). wjt is the weight of country j at time t in the overall HICP index
(∑Nj=1 wjt = 1) and N refers to the number of countries under consideration.
Overall HICP inflation is denoted byΠt = ∑Nj=1 wjtΠjt, whereΠjt is overall inflation in
country j in time period t. Table 4 in Appendix A2 presents some summary statistics
on the RPV and inflation measures, see also Figures 3 and 4. Panel Unit root tests
indicate that all inflation and RPV measures are stationary.7
Theories on the relation between inflation and RPV emphasize the different roles of
expected and unexpected inflation. In line with the empirical literature, we base our
measures of expected inflation on a time series representation of inflation. Specifically,
5Notable exceptions include Lach and Tsiddon (1992), Reinsdorf (1994), Fielding and Mizen (2000),
and Caglayan et al. (2008).
6These HICP subcategories are: food and non-alcoholic beverages (CP01); alcoholic beverages, to-
bacco and narcotics (CP02); clothing and footwear (CP03); housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels
(CP04); furnishing, household equipment and routine maintenance of the house (CP05); health (CP06);
transport (CP07); communication (CP08); recreation and culture (CP09); education (CP10); restaurants
and hotels (CP11); miscellaneous goods and services (CP12). Data series are seasonally adjusted using
the Census X11 procedure.
7Results of the Panel Unit Root tests are not presented but are available on request.
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we estimate an AR(12) model for piit and Πt.8 Expected inflation is derived as the
one period-ahead inflation forecast while unexpected inflation is the resulting forecast
error. Note that beating the forecasting performance of univariate time series models
of inflation is not an easy task, particularly over a monthly forecast horizon, see e.g.
Elliott and Timmermann (2008).
4 Empirical Results
4.1 The Empirical Model
This Section studies the implications given by the Head and Kumar monetary search
model. Since expected inflation in the Head and Kumar model stems from growth in
the stock of fiat money our analysis focuses on overall expected inflation (Πe). Fur-
thermore, to control for the predictions of menu-cost and signal extraction models,
we follow the empirical literature on the intramarket inflation-RPV relationship (see
e.g. Lach and Tsiddon, 1992) and include the absolute values of expected (piei ) and
unexpected (pii − piei ) product specific inflation into our fixed-effects panel equation:
RPVit = αi + λt + β1|pieit|+ β2|(piit − pieit)|+ β3|Πet − a|+ β4Dt|Πet − a|+ eit (2)
According to Hypothesis 1, the relationship between overall expected inflation and
price dispersion can be captured via a V-shaped specification where the vertex occurs
at positive levels of expected HICP inflation. Following Caglayan et al. (2008), we
therefore include |Πet − a| (with a ≥ 0) into our regression model. For a > 0 the vertex
of the V-shaped inflation-RPV relation shifts away from the origin towards positive
values of expected overall inflation. Theory suggests that the response of RPV to ex-
pected inflation is asymmetric. The asymmetry is captured by the term Dt|Πet − a|
where Dt is a dummy variable which equals one when Πt < a and zero otherwise.
8Additionally to the autoregressive parts in the piit forecast model, we also include past values of
overall HICP inflation (up to 3 lags).
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Accordingly, for levels of inflation below a the slope of the V-shaped inflation-RPV
nexus equals β3 + β4. Whereas for inflation rates above a, the marginal impact of in-
flation on RPV is given by β3. Finally, our specification includes a product fixed effect
which controls for product heterogeneity and monthly time dummies. In line with
Caglayan et al. (2008), the model is estimated by means of minimizing the sum of
squared residuals SSR using a grid search procedure for a.9 Recall from Section 2 that
the parameter value of a identifies the vertex of the inflation-RPV nexus which can be
used as a proxy for the optimal welfare maximizing inflation rate Π∗.
4.2 Inflation and Price Dispersion in a Less Integrated Market
The estimation results for the EU 27 economy are shown in the first column of Table 1.
As predicted by menu-cost and misperception models, we find a significant positive
effect of expected and unexpected product specific inflation on price dispersion. More
interestingly, however, the estimated vertex a in the inflation-RPV nexus is greater
than zero resulting in a right shift of the V-shaped inflation-RPV nexus. For the huge,
and probably less integrated, EU 27 market, the null hypothesis a = 0 is rejected at
the 1% significance level. Moreover, both inflation coefficients, β̂3 and β̂4, are highly
significant and plausibly signed. Thus, in line with Hypothesis 1, the estimated re-
lationship between inflation and price dispersion is asymmetrically V-shaped. Note
that the estimated vertex, a∗ = 0.0025, implies that the optimal annual inflation rate
for the EU-27 economy should be about 3% which is close to the European Central
Bank’s definition of price stability.
9The starting point of our grid search is a = 0. Subsequently, we increase a in increments of 0.00025
up to a = 0.0075. Note that the average values of monthly overall inflation for our two country samples
are 0.001723 and 0.002703 (0.021 and 0.032 in annual terms), respectively (see Table 4). So, a = 0.0075
seems to be a reasonable endpoint.
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Table 1: Inflation and Relative Price Variability in the European Union:
An empirical test of the Head and Kumar monetary search model
RPVit = αi + λt + β1|pieit|+ β2|(piit − pieit)|
+β3|Πet − a|+ β4Dt|Πet − a|+ eit
























Product Groups 12 12
Countries 27 12
Notes: Expected and unexpected inflation series are based on an AR forecast model
(see Section 3.1). a∗ is an estimated parameter minimizing the sum of squared residu-
als. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets.
Dt is a dummy variable equal to 1 when Πet < a and zero otherwise.
∗, ∗∗ indicate
significance at the 5% and 1% significance level. Following Hansen (1999) a bootstrap
procedure was used to obtain p-values for testing H0: a=0. Sample: 05/1997-08/2008.
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4.3 Inflation and RPV in a Highly Integrated Market
The second column of Table 1 presents the estimation results for the Euro-area panel, a
textbook example for a highly integrated market. Compared to the EU 27 estimation,
the effect of overall expected inflation changes substantially. First of all, the optimal
a in the Euro-area is equal to zero. Furthermore, the parameter estimates on β3 and
β4 are not statistically different from zero. In fact, no real effects of expected HICP
inflation on price dispersion can be found for the Euro-area.10 According to Hypoth-
esis 2, the estimated break down of the inflation-RPV nexus for the highly integrated
Euro-area market is predicted by the monetary search model.
5 Changes in the Level of Market Integration over Time
The results presented in the previous section indicate the importance of the degree
of market integration for the relationship between inflation and price dispersion in
Europe. Apparently, there is little room for discussion whether Euro-area countries are
more integrated compared to all EU-27 member states. Yet, there may exist changes in
the level of European market integration over time. This section accounts for possible
variations in the degrees of market integration within a country group by splitting the
sample periods according to major political changes.
5.1 The Effect of the 2004 EU Enlargement
On the first of May 2004, the European Union saw its biggest enlargement to date
when ten countries joined the EU. This may have had significant consequences for
market integration within the acceding countries. To analyze the effect of the 2004 EU
enlargement on market integration and, thereby, on the relationship between inflation
10Adding a measure of overall unexpected inflation (Π−Πe) to Equation (2) does not influence these
results. The parameter estimates on overall unexpected inflation are insignificant in all models. More-
over, for a panel consisting of EU-15 countries (Euro-area plus Denmark, Sweden, and the United King-
dom) the results do not qualitatively differ from those presented for the Euro-area.
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and price dispersion, we introduce a new country panel, called acc-2004, which in-
cludes all countries involved in the 2004 EU enlargement. Thus, acc-2004 consists of
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slove-
nia, and Slovakia.
Table 2: Inflation and Relative Price Variability:
The EU enlargement in 2004
RPVit = αi + λt + β1|pieit|+ β2|(piit − pieit)|


























Product Groups 12 12
Countries 10 10
Notes: Acceding countries panel used. See Table 1 for further explanations.
The results for the pre- and post-05/2004 regressions of the acceding countries panel
are shown in Table 2. Again, in line with menu cost and misperception models the im-
pact of expected and unexpected product specific inflation is highly significant. This
holds for the pre- and post-2004 period. However, there are notable differences with
respect to overall expected inflation. In the pre-2004 regression, we find evidence of a
significant asymmetric V-shaped relation between overall expected inflation and RPV,
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where the vertex occurs at positive levels of inflation. More precisely, the estimated
optimal inflation rate is close to 6.9% in annual terms which clearly exceeds the opti-
mal inflation rate estimated for the complete panel of 27 EU countries. Higher optimal
inflation rates in the acceding countries group which primarily consists of less devel-
oped Eastern European countries might be explained by higher productivity growth
rates, see e.g. E´gert et al. (2003). By contrast, the results for the post-2004 period indi-
cate no significant relationship between overall expected inflation and price dispersion
in the acc-2004 panel. In particular, the null hypothesis a = 0 can not be rejected.
From the perspective of the Head and Kumar monetary search model, these results
suggest that there are substantial variations in market integration over time. East-
ern European markets are more integrated in the post-2004 period which causes the
distorting effects of HICP inflation on price dispersion to disappear.
5.2 The Introduction of the Euro
Within the Euro-area group, the introduction of the Euro might have influenced mar-
ket integration. In monetary search models search costs are certainly more affected
by all price quotes given in a common currency instead of a currency in non-physical
form where price comparisons come at the cost of using fixed exchange rates. There-
fore, we split the sample period into the pre-Euro part (05/1997-12/2001) and the
post-Euro part (01/2002-08/2008).
Table 3 summarizes the results for the Euro-area. While the effects of expected and
unexpected product specific inflation are significant different from zero, overall ex-
pected inflation has no impact on price dispersion. This holds for both, the pre- and
post-Euro samples. Furthermore, the shift of the V-shaped inflation-RPV nexus is not
statistically different from zero in both sub-samples. The introduction of the Euro in
2002 had no impact on the relationship between inflation and RPV. Even before the
Euro was introduced no significant impact of overall expected inflation on RPV can
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be found. These results are in line with Engel and Rogers (2004) and Parsley and Wei
(2008) who find no evidence for an significant change in the integration of Eurozone
consumer markets after the introduction of the Euro. They conclude that market inte-
gration in Europe occurred already throughout the decade of the 1990s.
Table 3: Inflation and Relative Price Variability:
The Introduction of the Euro
RPVit = αi + λt + β1|pieit|+ β2|(piit − pieit)|


























Product Groups 12 12
Countries 12 12
Notes: Euro-area panel used. See Table 1 for further explanations.
6 Conclusion
In contrast to classical menu-cost or misperception models, the monetary search model
recently established by Head and Kumar (2005) predicts that the relationship between
inflation and the variability of relative prices is non-linear. In this model, the impact of
inflation on price dispersion and welfare crucially depends on the level of search costs.
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If search costs are sufficiently high, the relationship between inflation and both, price
dispersion and welfare is predicted to be asymmetrically V-shaped with a positive ver-
tex indicating the optimal rate of inflation. In case of very low search costs, however,
the model implies that the relationship between inflation and price dispersion breaks
down.
In this paper, we use monthly CPI-data of a panel of 27 EU countries to test the em-
pirical content of both predictions. Assuming that search costs should be negatively
related to the level of market integration, we estimate the inflation-RPV nexus for two
subgroups of EU countries, i.e. the highly integrated Euro-area and the less integrated
EU 27 economy.
Our empirical results confirm both theoretical predictions for the role of inflation re-
garding different levels of market integration. On the one hand, the relation between
RPV and HICP inflation is V-shaped for the less integrated EU27 countries, where the
vertex occurs at positive values of inflation. On the other hand, we found no impact
of inflation on RPV for the highly integrated markets of the Euro-area. These results
proved to be robust with respect to alternative splits of the sample, accounting for a
particular role of acceding countries in the EU enlargement of 2004 and the introduc-
tion of the Euro.
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Appendix
A1 The Monetary Search Model
A1.1 Basic Model Setup
The Head and Kumar (2005) monetary search economy consists of H ≥ 3 different
types of households, with a continuum of identical sellers and buyers in each house-
hold and a continuum of identical households in each type. A type h household pro-
duces good h and derives utility only from consumption of good h + 1, modulo H.
Exchange is facilitated by the existence of fiat money. At the beginning of each period
households receive a lump-sum transfer of new units of fiat money from the govern-
ment that has no other purpose than to increase the stock of money at gross rate γ.
Members of a representative type h who are sellers produce good h at marginal costs
φ. In contrast, buyers of this representative household observe random number of
price quotes and may purchase good h+ 1 at the lowest price observed. Let qkt denote
the measure of the household’s buyers who observe k ∈ {1, 2, ...., K} price quotes in
period t. For each price quote observed, the household pays a search cost of µ units.
Thus, household’s total disutility of search in period t is equal to µ∑Kk=1 kqkt.
11 Over-
all, a representative household maximizes the expected discounted sum of utility from






βt [(u(ct)− φyt − µ(2− qt)]
}
, (3)
where β is a discount factor, ct is consumption of the preferred good in time period t
and yt is total production in period t.
Restricting the analysis to symmetric and stationary monetary equilibria (SME’s), buy-
ers’ reservation levels are endogenous and depend on the marginal value of fiat money.
11 Without loss of generality, we will assume in the following that K = 2 (see also Head and Kumar,
2005, Corollary 2). This causes buyers to observe either one price quote with probability qt or two prices
with probability 1− qt. Hence, total search costs in period t are equal to µ(2− qt).
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Furthermore, all households choose the same probability for their buyers to observe
different numbers of price quotes, the same distribution of posted prices, and all have
the same consumption, money holdings, and valuation of money. It is also important
to note that if the SME is characterized by some buyers observing one price while oth-
ers observe two, then the distribution of prices will exhibit price dispersion necessarily
(Head and Kumar, 2005, p. 542). Moreover, in this model the relationship between in-
flation and RPV is determined by two opposing effects resulting in an asymmetrically
V-shaped inflation-RPV nexus (see Section 2).
A1.2 The Importance of Search Costs
According to Head and Kumar (2005) the household’s optimal choice of q is given by
q∗ =

0 i f µ < µL ≡ u′(c2)[c2 − c1]
[u
′−1( µc2−c1 )−c2]
c1−c2 i f µL ≤ µ ≤ µH
1 i f µ > µH ≡ u′(c1)[c2 − c1]
(4)
where c1 and c2 are the expected purchases of buyers observing one and two price
quotes, respectively, and µL and µH are state contingent cut-off levels for search costs.
Equation (4) illustrates the importance of search costs for the household’s search strat-
egy and ultimately for the existence of an equilibrium with price dispersion. More
specifically, an SME with price dispersion only exists if search costs lie in a certain
interval (µL ≤ µ ≤ µH). In a low search cost market (µ < µL) the household behaves
optimally by setting the probability of observing only one price quote equal to zero.
In this scenario, sellers’ market power erodes, the price distribution is concentrated
around the marginal cost price and the real effects of inflation vanish. With very high
search costs (µ > µH) the household has no incentive to have any of its buyers ob-
serve a second price quote, q∗ = 1. Here, the sellers’ act as monopolists and the price
is equal to the buyer’s reservation level.
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A1.3 Results from a Simulation Study
In our model simulation, we use a CRRA utility function with the coefficient of relative
risk aversion equal to 1.5 and set the discount factor, β, equal to 0.95. To achieve an
average mark-up of prices over marginal costs of 10%, we set φ = 0.1 and µ = 0.028.
This mark-up value is consistent with plausible estimates from the literature (see e.g.
Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido, 2001). Furthermore, we allow γ, the growth rate of the
money stock (the inflation rate), to range between 1 and 1.4. The solid line in Figure
1, as well as, the upper graph of Figure 2 depict the V-shaped relationship between
inflation and price dispersion for this benchmark scenario.
The middle graph in Figure 2 demonstrates how lower search costs affect the inflation-
RPV nexus. Compared to the benchmark simulation search costs are set equal to 0.021
(mark-up = 7.4%) which causes the inflation-RPV relationship to shift downwards.
Decreasing the level of search cots even further (µ = 0.0093) results in a breakdown of
the non-linear inflation-RPV linkage (see lower graph in Figure 2). In this case price
dispersion equals zero for any level of inflation.
Overall, for a high search cost market RPV is V-shaped in expected overall inflation
with the vertex occurring at positive levels of the inflation measure. But, if search cost






















































































































































































































































Figure 3: Product specific inflation and RPV (Euro-area)
(a) CP01 (b) CP02 (c) CP03
(d) CP04 (e) CP05 (f) CP06
(g) CP07 (h) CP08 (i) CP09
(j) CP10 (k) CP11 (l) CP12
Notes: Monthly HICP product specific inflation rates (left scale). Monthly product specific RPV
(right scale). 1996.02-2008.08.
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Figure 4: Product specific inflation and RPV (EU-27)
(a) CP01 (b) CP02 (c) CP03
(d) CP04 (e) CP05 (f) CP06
(g) CP07 (h) CP08 (i) CP09
(j) CP10 (k) CP11 (l) CP12




des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft  





2010/1             BÖNKE, Timm / Sebastian EICHFELDER 
                        Horizontal equity in the German tax-benefit system 
                        Economics 
 
2010/2             BECKER, Sascha / Dieter NAUTZ 
                        Inflation, Price Dispersion and Market Integration through the Lens of a Monetary  
                        Search Model 
                        Economics 
